Paramilitary Police State & Private Prisons

Homeland Security's Cyber Bill Would Codify Executive Emergency Powers

June 10, 2010

The Atlantic Monthly - At the beginning of the year, the chances that some sort of cybersecurity legislation would reach the president's desk by the end of 2010 were remote. But as of today, there are a half dozen such bills circulating, and the sense of urgency is there, thanks to a huge and largely unremarked upon public lobbying campaign by the defense industry that may or may not comport with the actual level of threat. I don't mean that as a snide aside; I just don't know how vulnerable we are at this moment.

Today, the Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee unveils its legislation, which would create a Senate-confirmable cyber director in the executive office of the president and imbue him or her with significant emergency powers.

The Protecting Cyberspace as a National Asset Act of 2010 (PC-NNA ... PC Nana?) is "designed to bring together the disjointed efforts of multiple federal agencies and departments to prevent cyber theft, intrusions, and attacks across the federal government and the private sector," its chief author, Sen. Joe Lieberman, will say in prepared remarks today.

"The bill would establish a clear organizational structure to lead federal efforts in safeguarding cyber networks. And it would build a public/private partnership to increase the preparedness and resiliency of those private critical infrastructure cyber networks upon which our way of life depends."

The bill would create another Senate-confirmable position, the head of a new National Cybersecurity and Communications Center inside the Department of Homeland Security; the new NCCC would be responsible for threat prevention and mitigation. It would develop risk-based standards for infrastructure with industry and oversee their implementation. Private entities whose power plants or grids or systems are considered vulnerable and critical could choose among a menu of standards.

According to a summary of the legislation, the Act would also create a "responsible" framework for giving the executive branch significant emergency power in the event of a major intrusion or threat.

The President must notify Congress in advance about the threat and the emergency measures that will be taken to mitigate it. Any emergency measures imposed must be the least disruptive necessary to respond to the threat. These emergency measures will expire after 30 days unless the President orders an extension. The bill does not authorize any new surveillance authorities, or permit the government to "take over" private networks.

Industry will read this part of the bill very carefully, as will civil libertarians. The White House believes it already has a lot of these powers, although it welcomes Congress's attempt to codify them, but my sense is that the National Security Staff does not want to create any new cyber infrastructure within the already over-burdened executive office of the president, and isn't keen on having the top two cyber positions be Senate confirmable.

G20 Security to Jam Cellphone Signals

June 10, 2010

The Canadian Press - Wireless companies say they’ve been told their signals may be jammed during the G8 and G20 summits, but aren’t being given any more information about how thousands of cellphone users could be affected.

While the G8 summit is in Ontario cottage country, the G20 is in the heart of downtown Toronto, and widespread shutdown of cellphone networks could wreak havoc on businesses already preparing to take a hit from security precautions in place for the meetings.

But the technology is expected to be used only to create a moving bubble of electronic silence around motorcades.

“No one will be informed of locations and times for security reasons,” said one wireless industry source.

The Integrated Security Unit responsible for the summits wouldn’t comment on security plans.

“We use a lot of different techniques in ensuring security to deal with possible threats and we never share those techniques, we don’t make them public,” said Sgt. Leo Monbourquette, a spokesman for the ISU.

In order to jam the signals, the RCMP must apply for an exemption from the Radiocommunications Act, which generally forbids interfering with the airwaves.

It’s unknown whether they’ve applied for one for the summits, as approvals are only published after the fact. But the first RCMP exemption was for the 2002 G8 Summit in Kananaskis, Alta.

Often, the wireless industry itself receives no advance notice at all, said Marc Choma, director of communications for the Canadian Wireless Telecommunications Association.

But what interference there may be rarely lasts long, he said.

“The thing with jamming technologies, because a lot of law enforcement themselves, their communications, are wireless as well, you’d have to try and specify what kind of frequencies that you were trying to jam,” he said.

“The jamming is not precise, you can’t say I only want it to go one metre and three centimetres, so it could be going farther than you think. There is possibility it would interfere with other types of communications.”

With cellphones and remote controls often tools of choice for setting off bombs, jammers have become a regular security tool at major national and international events.

A search of orders-in-council shows the RCMP most recently received an exemption from the act for the visit of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at the end of May.

They were also granted an OK for the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver and Whistler, B.C.

A spokesperson for the RCMP-led Integrated Security Unit which oversaw the Games wouldn’t say whether the technology was actually used for the Olympics.

An exemption is often applied for just in case the power is needed, said Dawn Roberts.

But even if it had been deployed, cellphone users may never have noticed, she said.

“It may appear as a dropped call,” she said.

“A lot of the cellphone action is very site-to-site directional. Walking past a high rise building could have the same the effect. It’s not as if a big bubble goes out and we have a cone or dome that’s widespread.”

Thousands Wrongly Detained in Police Terror Law Blunder

June 10, 2010

London Times - Fourteen police forces have unlawfully stopped and searched thousands of people on the streets under controversial counter terror powers, the Home Office disclosed today.

The blunder occurred when police detained people without having permission to do so from a Home Office minister. On other occasions police continued to stop and search people for longer than they had been given authorisation under the law.

The 14 police forces involved are now in the process of establishing how many people have been wrongly stopped and search but in London alone the figure is 840.

The serious errors were uncovered during an internal Home Office review of the authorisation process for stop and searches under Section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000. Under the power, police can stop and search members of the public in a designated area without having a reasonable suspicion that they are involved in crime.

Baroness Neville-Jones, the Security Minister, said:

“I am very concerned by these historical administrative errors. To maintain public confidence in our counter-terrorism powers, it is absolutely crucial all those responsible for exercising them do so properly.

“I take these matters extremely seriously and have instructed the department to conduct an urgent review of current procedures to ensure that errors can be prevented in future.”

She added: “The Government is already committed to undertaking a review of counter-terrorism legislation which will include the use of stop-and-search powers in section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000. We shall make our findings known as soon as possible.”

In a written ministerial statement to MPs, Nick Herbert, the Police Minister, said that the Metropolitan Police had found one authorisation to stop and search people in April 2004 that had not been authorised by the Home Secretary within 48 hours, as required by law.

The police paperwork error led to a review in May this year of all authorisations under Section 44 powers since the Terrorism Act 2000 became law in February 2001.

It found that on 33 occasions authorisations were said to be for 29 days and on two occasions for 30 days when the lawful maximum is 28 days. In two cases authorisations were not confirmed by the Home Secretary within 48 hours.

Mr Herbert said:

“All of these cases appear to have been as a result of administrative errors that were not identified at the time by either the police or the Home Office.”

The police forces involved in the paperwork blunder are Kent, Sussex, Durham, Cleveland, City of London, Metropolitan Police, Thames Valley, North Yorkshire, Hampshire, Bedfordshire, Essex, Greater Manchester, Fife and South Wales.