U.S. Supported Radical Islamist Groups in Syria and Iraq That Eventually Morphed Into ISIS

In 2012, the major forces driving the insurgency in Syria were the Muslim Brotherhood, Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and the Salafists, an ultra-conservative, orthodox movement within Sunni Islam, taking a fundamentalist approach toward Islam, from which ISIS draws is radical, violent, merciless beliefs. According to a 2012 DoD document, "if the situation unravels, there is a possibility of establishing a declared or undeclared Salafist principality in eastern Syria, and this is exactly what the opposition [rebels backed by the U.S. and its allies] want in order to isolate the Syria's Shia regime, which is considered a strategic depth of the Shia expansion (Iraq and Iran)." It was a plan by the U.S. to use the Salafist movement to overthrow Syrian President Assad.

Syria is overwhelmingly Sunni Islam. That in and of itself is no big deal, as 85% of all the Muslims in the world are of the Sunni persuasion. The other 15% of Muslims in the world are of the Shi’a/Shi’ite variety.  So Syria is mostly Sunni. BUT Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, like his entire family and the ruling/military elite of Syria, is an Alawite. Alawites are a prominent minority religious group who describe themselves as a sect of Shi’a Islam. Some conservative Sunnis do not even recognize Alawis as Muslims at all, especially in places like ultra-conservative Saudi Arabia [a U.S. ally]. Of course, the ultra-conservative Sunni Saudis also don’t much like the straight-up Shi’as either…speaking of which… Do you know any other places that are Shi’a Islam? If you said Iran, then give yourself a hit off the hookah! And now you know why some other Arab states also hate Syria: the Syrian leadership has deep and entrenched ties with Shi’a Iran, a country that most other Arab states totally despise. Iran is not Sunni but Shi’a; they are also not Arab, but Persian. So Arab countries see increasingly powerful Iran as a regional threat.  And Syria has for decades allowed itself to be a conduit for the movement of weapons and money from Shi’a Iran thru Shi’a-led Syria over to Shi’a-inspired Hezbollah…which is a terrorist/political group located in Lebanon that fights against Israel. [Source]

Proof U.S. Government Wanted ISIS To Emerge In Syria (video)

November 20, 2015

Vigilant Citizen - In my article entitled ISIS : A CIA Creation to Justify War Abroad and Repression at Home, I list the numerous reasons why ISIS is actually serving the interests of the world elite. The following video adds another important piece of the puzzle by explaining leaked Department of Defense documents dating from 2012 – before ISIS even existed. They prove that the U.S. actually supported the radical Islamist groups in Syria and Iraq that eventually morphed into the monster that is ISIS.

This series of event lead to the creation of a (larger) quagmire in the Middle East, the migration of millions of Syrians towards the West and the generation of fear and panic around the world – perfect conditions for rushing new oppressive laws.



Here is the full PDF of the document obtained by Judicial Watch in a Freedom of Information action.

The relevant passage relating to the 'salafist principality', i.e. ISIS, is point 8C on page 5.

The explanation of who the 'supporting powers' are, i.e. 'The West' (= US, Israel, France, UK, Australia), Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, is point 2C on page 3.

https://www.judicialwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Pg.-291-Pgs.-287-293-JW-v-DOD-and-State-14-812-DOD-Release-2015-04-10-final-version11.pdf

Syria war widens rift between Shia clergy in Iraq, Iran

Although Iraqi Al-Sistani refuses to sanction fighting in Syria war, influential Shia parties and militias are following Iran's direction and sending fighters

July 20, 2013

Reuters - The civil war in Syria is widening a rift between top Shia Muslim clergy in Iraq and Iran who have taken opposing stands on whether or not to send followers into combat on President Bashar Al-Assad's side.

Competition for leadership of the Shia community has intensified since the US-led invasion of 2003 toppled Saddam Hussein, empowering majority Shias through the ballot box and restoring the Iraqi holy city of Najaf to prominence.

In Iran's holy city of Qom, senior Shia clerics, or Marjiiya, have issued fatwas (edicts) enjoining their followers to fight in Syria, where mainly Sunni rebels are fighting to overthrow Assad, whose Alawite sect derives from Shia Islam.

Shia militant leaders fighting in Syria and those in charge of recruitment in Iraq say the number of volunteers has increased significantly since the fatwas were pronounced.

Tehran, Assad's staunchest defender in the region, has drawn on other Shia allies, including Lebanese militia Hezbollah.

Hezbollah's open intervention earlier this year hardened the sectarian tone of a conflict that grew out of a peaceful street uprising against four decades of Assad family rule, and shifted the battlefield tide in the Syrian government's favour.

The Syrian war has polarised Sunnis and Shias across the Middle East – but has also spotlighted divisions within each of Islam's two main denominations, putting Qom and Najaf at odds and complicating intra-Shia relations in Iraq.

In Najaf, Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, who commands unswerving loyalty from most Iraqi Shias and many more worldwide, has refused to sanction fighting in a war he views as political rather than religious.

Despite Sistani's stance, some of Iraq's most influential Shia political parties and militia, who swear allegiance to Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, have answered his call to arms and sent their disciples into battle in Syria.

"Those who went to fight in Syria are disobedient," said a senior Shia cleric who runs the office of one of the top four Marjiya in Najaf.

"Shia crescent"

The split is rooted in a fundamental difference of opinion over the nature and scope of clerical authority.

Najaf Marjiiya see the role of the cleric in public affairs as limited, whereas in Iran, the cleric is the Supreme Leader and holds ultimate spiritual and political authority in the "Velayet e-Faqih" system ("guardianship of the jurist").

"The tension between the two Marjiiya already existed a long time ago, but now it has an impact on the Iraqi position towards the Syria crisis," a senior Shia cleric with links to Marjiiya in Najaf said on condition of anonymity.

"If both Marjiiya had a unified position (toward Syria), we would witness a position of (Iraqi) government support for the Syrian regime".

The Shia-led government in Baghdad says it takes no sides in the civil war, but the flow of Iraqi militiamen across the border into Syria has compromised that official position.

Khamenei and his faithful in Iraq and Iran regard Syria as an important link in a "Shia Crescent" stretching from Tehran to Beirut through Baghdad and Damascus, according to senior clerics and politicians.

Answering a question posted on his website by one of his followers regarding the legitimacy of fighting in Syria, senior Iraq Shia cleric Kadhim Al-Haeari, who is based in Iran, described fighting in Syria as a "duty" to defend Islam.

Militants say that around 50 Iraqi Shias fly to Damascus every week to fight, often alongside Assad's troops, or to protect the Sayyida Zeinab shrine on the outskirts of the capital, an especially sacred place for Shias.

"I am following my Marjiiya. My spiritual leader has said fighting in Syria is a legitimate duty. I do not pay attention to what others say," said Ali, a former Mehdi army militant who was packing his bag to travel from Iraq to Syria.

"No one has the right to stop me. I am defending my religion, my Imam's daughter Sayyida Zeinab's shrine."

A high-ranking Shia cleric who runs the office of one of the four top Marjiiya in Najaf said the protection of Shia shrines in Syria was used as a pretext by Iran to galvanise Shias into action.

"Shia project"

In the 10 years since Saddam's fall, Iran's influence in Iraq has grown and it has sought to gain a foothold in Najaf in particular.

Senior Iranian clerics have opened offices in Najaf, as well as non-governmental organisations, charities and cultural institutions, most of which are funded directly by Marjiiya in Iran, or the Iranian Embassy in Baghdad, local officials said.

The Iranian flag flies over a two-storey building in an upscale neighbourhood of Najaf, which houses the "Imam Khomeini Institution," named after the Islamic Republic's founder, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

The Imam Khomeini Institution is one of many Iranian entities that have engaged in social activities in Iraq, focusing on young men, helping them get married, and paying regular stipends to widows, orphans and students of religion.

Some institutions also support young clerics and fund free trips for university students to visit Shia shrines in Iran, including a formal visit to Khamenei's office in Tehran, Shia politicians with knowledge of the activities say.

"We have a big project in Iraq aimed at spreading the principles of Velayet e-Faqih and the young are our target," a high-ranking Shia leader who works under Khamenei's auspices said on condition of anonymity.

"We are not looking to establish an Islamic State in Iraq, but at least we want to create revolutionary entities that would be ready to fight to save the Shia project".

Comment About the Salafis from Vigilant Citizen

If you studied Quranic Arabic under a qualified scholar you would know its true meaning.

There are several branches and sub-branches in the sciences of Quran Exegesis. Unlike many other languages, an Arabic word is interpreted according to its root meaning and context and NOT necessarily literally. Many verses in the Quran are Mejaz, allegorical and metaphorically interpreted. A word can have several different meanings and connotations.

The verses most commonly misinterpreted are cherry picked ones used by Western non-Muslim detractors to make a moot point. There are quoted completely out of context! What are the verses before "SLAY the UNBELIEVERS wherever you find them!" and after it?

You must know the difference between Ahle-Kitab, Kaffir, Mushrik, Munafiq etc...

"Surely those who believe, and those who are Jews, and the Christians, and the Sabians - whoever believes in God and the Last Day and does good, they shall have their reward from their Lord. And there will be no fear for them, nor shall they grieve" (2:62, 5:69, and many other verses).

Muslims follow the Quran according to the Sunnah (example and practice in sayings and actions) of the Prophet (PBUH), a mercy for mankind. He was the living Quran. Even during wars for defensive measures, a strict code of conduct was made not to harm any innocent non-combatants, including women, children, the old, the infirm and ill, animals and even trees.

ISIS breaks every rule of the Quran and Sunnah. The core group cannot be Muslims.

Yes, of course there are Muslims that interpret the Quran literally and are usually known as Wahaabis and Salafis. These are the creation of the British during the 18th century.

The overwhelming majority of Muslims worldwide are NOT Wahaabis and Salafis.

Every terrorist in the West can be traced back to the intelligences services. FBI admits to setting up Muslim patsies.

How many million Muslims are there in the USA? What percentage of them are involved in terrorist activities? Even if a fraction of the 'practicing' Muslims followed the Quran literally, you would find chaos and mayhem in every major city, life as we know it would be disrupted.

How many names do you know of the many Muslims who also perished in the Twin towers on 911? Did you know Muslim cab drivers in NY ferried the injured to hospitals without charging them, putting considerable risk to themselves? Did you know among the doctors and surgeons who treated the injured were Muslims too?

There is a verse in the Quran that states '...he who saves the life of one human being, is like one who saves entire mankind, and he who takes one innocent life is as if he has taken the life of every human being on this planet." There is no distinction between a non-Muslim and a Muslim.

I practice natural medicine and chose this field to heal ANY individual without compensation because it brings me great joy to help others. I have received much goodness from non-Muslims throughout my life and I am playing my part in returning some of the goodness back to them. Call it Karma if you like.

I'll leave you with this, an American soldier who converted to Islam after returning from the first Gulf war where 20,000 servicemen and women converted to Islam, said this to a Muslim cleric, 'we had to invade YOUR country to really learn about Islam." Youtube "American soldier converts to Islam."

Some of staunchest defenders of the Islamic faith are NOT Muslims, they are actually Christians, Jews, Hindus etc...

"....I became more than ever convinced that it was not the sword that won a place for Islam in those days in the scheme of life. It was the rigid simplicity, the utter sel-effacement of the prophet, the scrupulous regard for his pledges, his intense devotion to his friends and followers, his intrepidity, his fearlessness, his absolute trust in God and in his own mission. These, and NOT the sword carried everything before them and surmounted every trouble." - Mahatama Ghandi - [Young India (periodical), 1928, Volume X

This site (Vigilant Citizen) documents the various symbolism that I have been aware of for over thirty years. The Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) stated, "I shall tell you one thing of the Anti-Christ (Dajaal) that no other Prophet before me has mentioned, that he (Dajaal) is one-eyed and your Lord is NOT one-eyed."

From Vigilant Citizen

Through terrifying headlines and shocking videos, ISIS is being used as a tool to justify war in the Middle East and to cause fear and panic worldwide. No, this is not a “crazy conspiracy theory”, it is simply the oldest trick in the book. ISIS was created by the very forces that are fighting it.

Ever since the creation of democratic nations – where public opinion somewhat matters – the political class is faced with a dilemma: War is needed to gain power, riches, and control, but the general public has a tendency to be against it. What to do? The answer was found decades ago and is still used successfully today: Create an enemy so terrifying that the masses will beg their government to go to war.

This is why ISIS exists. This is why the beheading videos are so “well-produced” and publicized worldwide through mainstream media. This is why news sources regularly come up with alarmist headlines about ISIS. They are used to serve the best interests of the world elite.

The current objectives are: Sway public opinion to favor the invasion of countries in the Middle East, provide a pretext for “coalition” intervention across the world, and manufacture a domestic threat that will be used to take away rights and increase surveillance. In short, ISIS is yet another instance of the age-old tactic of creating a terrifying enemy to scare the masses.

Basically, in the span of a few months, a terrorist group literally popped out of nowhere, causing mayhem in the very regions the US and its allies have been looking to attack for years. Its name: Islamic State in Syria, or ISIS.

The idea of the CIA funding an Islamic group to further its political interests isn’t exactly “far-fetched”. In fact, there are several obvious instances in recent history where the US openly supported extremist Islamist groups (dubbed “freedom fighters” in mass media). The most flagrant and well-documented example is the creation of the Mujaheddin in Afghanistan, a group that was created by the CIA to lure the USSR in an “Afghan trap”. The term Mujaheddin describes “Muslims who struggle in the path of Allah” and comes from the root word “jihad”. The “great enemy” of today was the friend of the past. A few decades later, these “freedom fighters” turned into the Taliban terrorists, among them Osama bin-Laden, who turned from a CIA agent to public enemy No. 1. The group was then used to justify war in Afghanistan. It is one of numerous examples where an Islamic group was created, funded and used to advance U.S. interests. The U.S. also backed the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Sarekat Islam in Indonesia, Jamaat-e-Islami in Pakistan, and the Islamic regime of Saudi-Arabia to counter Russia.

As the ISIS threat spreads to neighboring countries, it will allow unprovoked military strikes against various nations. It is only a matter of time before airstrikes will be deemed ineffective and ground troops become necessary. In the end, these operations will complete a long-term plan of re-organizing the Middle East, eliminating any threats to Israel and significantly increasing pressure on Iran, the region’s remaining Islamic force.

Disgusted by the beheading videos, most Westerners now favor the violent annihilation of ISIS.  Of course, they do not realize that this same fervor will lead them to become victims of their own governments. ISIS has been issuing various threats to specific countries, causing panic in every one of them, prompting governments to “take action”. Unfortunately, “taking action” means reducing free speech and increasing illegal searches and surveillance.

The most important question one can ask is this: Who benefits from the existence of ISIS and the terror it generates? What does ISIS gain by creating videos taunting the most powerful armies in the world? Air strikes? On the other hand, what does the ruling class in the Western world have to gain? Continuing to make money through war and weapons, taking control of the Middle East while supporting Israel, increasing oppression and surveillance on domestic populations and, finally, keeping the masses constantly terrified and under control. In short, stoking panic around the world by provoking a state of chaos in the Middle East has been deemed necessary to implement a new world order.

The Rise of Persian Salafism

Mehdi Khalaji, senior fellow at The Washington Institute
October 3, 2013

More Iranians are turning to Salafism out of disenchantment with the Islamic Republic's Shiite creeds, creating a clear threat to the regime's rule.

Iran consistently accuses the United States and its allies in the Middle East of provoking tension between Shiite and Sunni Muslims. Among these accusations is the notion that the West funds Persian-language satellite television networks whose sole goal is to ignite sectarian conflict. Tehran's paranoid claims aside, many Persian broadcasters inside and outside the Islamic Republic are in fact engaged in a satellite war, and their various propaganda salvos point to a new phenomenon in Iran: the rise of Persian Salafism. The fact that a unique, puritanical interpretation of Sunni Islam is taking root in Shiite-ruled Iran has raised worries among the regime's elite and the traditional Shiite establishment. 

IRANIANS DISCOVER SALAFISM

Since the early twentieth century, Salafism has been spreading throughout Muslim communities from Europe to Indonesia. Yet few expected it to gain much traction in Iran given the innate antagonism between Sunni and Shia Islam. Traces of it entered the country before the 1979 revolution, but the sect did not gain popularity until fairly recently, after more than three decades of Shiite governance and regime propaganda. Today, it commands numerous active followers in Sunni areas such as Kurdistan and Baluchistan and in large, predominantly Shiite cities such as Tehran and Isfahan.

The Iranian regime views religious pluralism in general as a security threat, but the rise of Salafism -- a sect that regards the state's official religion as heresy -- presents more serious problems. For example, the Bahai faith is also viewed as a threat to Iranian Shiism, but its structure makes it more containable than Salafism. Bahai adherents in Iran are well organized, highly centralized, and apolitical, making them easier to track and less of a direct threat. Yet Salafis are scattered throughout the country and represented by multiple organizations with theological and ideological variations. More important, they are becoming politically active in some Sunni areas, at least in terms of publicly criticizing the government, questioning its religious legitimacy, and accusing it of discrimination against Sunnis. 

PREREVOLUTIONARY ROOTS

Since the 1950s, Salafi thought -- in its general sense, which includes Muslim Brotherhood ideology -- has entered Iran from the east and west. Following World War II, Sayyid Gholam Reza Saeedi (1895-1990), an Iranian religious author and translator, traveled to India and acquired extensive knowledge about the international Muslim community and elite. When he returned home, he began to translate works by Abul Ala Maududi -- the main ideologue of Pakistani group Jamaat al-Islamiyah and a prominent Salafi -- as well as other Muslim thinkers (e.g., Muhammad Iqbal). A prolific author, Saeedi played a significant role in introducing Persian readers to Indian Muslim concerns and the challenges of founding a new country, Pakistan. His works opened a new window to Iran's religious world, influencing younger readers who were seeking new ideas on Islam in order to ease their frustration with the religious establishment and confront ideological threats (especially the communist wave that was taking over Iran's intellectual environment at the time).

Meanwhile, other prerevolutionary Iranian thinkers introduced the country to the Salafist ideas of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood. In the late 1940s, cleric Navab Safavi formed Fadayan-e Islam, the first Iranian Islamist group to establish relations with the Brotherhood and produce Persian translations of its writings, including the works of theoretician Sayyed Qutb. Another prominent cleric, Sayyid Hadi Khosrow Shahi (b. 1938), translated writings from Algerian, Tunisian, and Palestinian Islamists in addition to Brotherhood works. These and other translators were essentially political activists who sought to raise their countrymen's awareness of Muslim issues outside Iran. For example, the Islamist works they reproduced eventually created a new political question in Iran: the Palestine question.

While these translations were mostly received as ideological efforts to mobilize Iranians against Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi's regime and Western imperialism, Salafi thought also spurred some religious thinkers to fight "superstitions" in Shiism. Haidar Ali Qalamdaran (1913-1989) was heavily influenced by such writings and sought to purify Shiism of various prayers, rituals (e.g., pilgrimages to the shrines of the Shiite Imams of old and their descendants), and beliefs (e.g., the notion that the Shiite Imams had supernatural power and knowledge). He escaped an assassination attempt ostensibly motivated by traditional clerics in Qom and spent his whole life in isolation and poverty. Although he was not a political activist, his views had political implications in later years, such as refuting the legitimacy of the type of religious governance instituted by the Islamic Republic. He and others who criticized Shiite "superstitions" -- such as Muhammad Hassan Shariat Sanglaji (1855-1943) and Sayyid Abul Fazl Borqei (1909-1992) -- were also influenced by the Salafi conception of Islamic dogmas, especially the sect's interpretation of the unity of God. 

SALAFISM AS A POLITICAL REACTION

Under the Islamic Republic -- a regime that legitimizes the exclusive rule of the ayatollahs, makes Islamic law the main basis for legislation, and imposes it on all aspects of daily life -- many youths and other Iranians have turned away from Shiite convictions and embraced atheism, skepticism, Sufism, Sunni Islam, the Bahai faith, evangelical Christianity, Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, and New Age and Latin American mystical trends. Various regime organizations, including the Bureau of Religions and Sects in the Ministry of Intelligence, monitor these religious minorities and work against their proselytization efforts. Even Sufi circles -- which are officially Shiite -- face frequent repression.

In this environment, Salafism has rapidly spread all over the country through the internet, social media, and satellite television. In addition, various underground organizations offer training courses for young volunteers and run exchange programs to introduce Iranian Salafis to Arab Salafis in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere. This is one of the reasons why the regime does not allow Sunnis to build mosques in Tehran or other large cities -- it is deeply concerned about Salafis using them to recruit young Shiites who are frustrated with the Islamic Republic's ideology. 

SATELLITE WAR

There are two major Shiite trends in Iran: the official regime creed, and an extremist version that defines itself largely in opposition to Sunni Islam. While the regime usually dismisses Sunni-Shiite tensions and advocates pan-Islamic approaches to foreign policy and other matters, the extremist Shiites (called gholat or velais) refuse to hide their animosity toward the first three Sunni caliphs (i.e., the Prophet Muhammad's successors, whom Shiites believe usurped Imam Ali's right to rule). These extremists are backed by clerical authorities, and their explicit anti-Sunni propaganda has caused trouble for the regime both inside the country and throughout the wider Muslim world.

In recent years, the gholat have relied in large part on satellite television to disseminate their propaganda, sparking an escalating virtual war between Salafis and Shiites. Today, Salafis use Persian-language satellite outlets such as the Global Kalemeh Network (based in Medina and Dubai and probably funded by Saudis) and Wesal Farsi (based in London and the Persian Gulf) to fight the "Safavid government," as they call the Islamic Republic and its Shiite ideology. They broadcast religious programs, take calls from Iran, and engage in debates with Shiite satellite networks such as al-Kawthar TV, the Global Ahl-e Bait Network (whose programs are hosted by an Afghan cleric), Imam Hussein TV, and Salaam TV (based in Virginia and supported by the Shirazis, a clerical family with significant influence among Gulf Shiites).

Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood also use various websites to fight the propaganda battle, some affiliated with organizations such as Jamaat-e Dawat va Islah-e Iran (the Society of Mission and Reform in Iran). On the other side, extremist Shiites run dozens of their own websites to confront the Salafis. Both sides are very active in social media as well. 

CONCLUSION

Many Iranian youths are disappointed in the Shiism professed by the regime and traditional clergy but wish to maintain their Islamic faith, leading them to convert to Salafism. The Muslim Brotherhood and other Salafi trends tend to focus on the unity of god and the desacralization of all human beings and worldly things -- a unique way of secularizing and rationalizing Islam in order to attract young students, especially those who study science. Unlike traditional Sunnis in Iran and Salafis elsewhere in the world, Iranian Salafis tend to question the Islamic Republic's religious legitimacy and purposefully exacerbate Sunni-Shiite tensions. To be sure, they do not share the global Salafist aspiration of taking over political power, knowing that any Islamic government in predominantly Shiite Iran would be a Shiite government. Yet Iranian Salafis are organizationally connected to potent groups in Saudi Arabia and other countries, and most of their ideology and funding comes from outside the Islamic Republic. Given these factors and the increasing resentment among Iran's Arab, Kurdish, and Baluch population, the growth of Salafism is a clear security threat to the regime.

Syria's Bashar al-Assad Facts and Information

Official Stats

• Official Title: President
• Government: One-Party State...with authoritarian tendencies
• Years Left in Office: Indefinite; no term limits
• Political Classification: Right
• Education: Dr. of Opthamology
• Age: 50 (born November 11, 1965)

Important Points

• Bashar al-Assad is the President of Syria, having taken over from his father's 3 decade rule
• Bashar al-Assad is a younger, more moderate, more progressive Arab voice
• Bashar al-Assad has strong ties to Iran and Hezbollah, which pisses off the US, Israel, and some Arab states
• Bashar al-Assad is strengthening ties with France, the EU, Russia, and China
• Bashar al-Assad may soon recognize Israel, which would radically change Middle Eastern politics and policies

The Rundown

Okay let’s get serious about the Syrians…the leader of Syria to be succinct: President Bashar al-Assad. And this is a dude to know, as his youth combined with his unique outlook may possibly make him a serious mover, shaker, and peace-maker in the mangled mess we call the Middle East. And he has a wickedly wondrous wife to boot! She is one hot piece of Assad! Combined with Bashar’s 6’2 frame, dreamy steel-blue eyes and extended cranium, they may be the sexiest first family on the planet….but I digress as usual, let’s get back to the main man of Syria and why he is important to know…

Thrust into the presidency of Syria, the genial, unassuming, and gangly Bashar al-Asad has held his own in the rough-and-tumble arena of Middle Eastern politics. He is the second oldest son of regional heavyweight and former Syrian strongman President Hafiz al-Assad, a dude that held the leadership position for 30 years and stabilized the state while consolidating power to his person.  Originally, Bashar wanted nothing to do with any of that political poppycock! He was schooled in Syria and the UK to be an eye doctor and surgeon, and was doing quite well and living the good life as an ophthalmologist in London.  His older brother, Basil, had been groomed for the presidency but following Basil’s death in a single-car accident in 1994, Bashar (arguably a better driver) was yanked from his post abroad and prepared for his inevitable coming to power.

During his six-year political apprenticeship, Bashar learned the government ropes, met important Arab leaders, and got to know the movers and shakers in Syrian politics. He also completed some “hurry-up offense” military training, in order to secure the nominal backing of the important Syrian military ranks. When Daddy al-Assad died in 2000, Bashar easily secured his succession in a 2001 referendum, which isn’t really too hard to pull off in Syria—it’s not what we would call a real example of democracy in action, since the cards are all stacked in the Assad family’s favor. Example: A referendum in 2007 overwhelmingly endorsed him as president for a second seven-year term….oh, and he was the only candidate on the ballot. Nonetheless, Bashar was seen as the last great hope amongst domestic reformers due to his young age and technocratic savvy.

Okay let’s get serious about the Syrians…the leader of Syria to be succinct: President Bashar al-Assad. And this is a dude to know, as his youth combined with his unique outlook may possibly make him a serious mover, shaker, and peace-maker in the mangled mess we call the Middle East. And he has a wickedly wondrous wife to boot! She is one hot piece of Assad! Combined with Bashar’s 6’2 frame, dreamy steel-blue eyes and extended cranium, they may be the sexiest first family on the planet….but I digress as usual, let’s get back to the main man of Syria and why he is important to know…

Thrust into the presidency of Syria, the genial, unassuming, and gangly Bashar al-Asad has held his own in the rough-and-tumble arena of Middle Eastern politics. He is the second oldest son of regional heavyweight and former Syrian strongman President Hafiz al-Assad, a dude that held the leadership position for 30 years and stabilized the state while consolidating power to his person.  Originally, Bashar wanted nothing to do with any of that political poppycock! He was schooled in Syria and the UK to be an eye doctor and surgeon, and was doing quite well and living the good life as an ophthalmologist in London.  His older brother, Basil, had been groomed for the presidency but following Basil’s death in a single-car accident in 1994, Bashar (arguably a better driver) was yanked from his post abroad and prepared for his inevitable coming to power.

During his six-year political apprenticeship, Bashar learned the government ropes, met important Arab leaders, and got to know the movers and shakers in Syrian politics. He also completed some “hurry-up offense” military training, in order to secure the nominal backing of the important Syrian military ranks. When Daddy al-Assad died in 2000, Bashar easily secured his succession in a 2001 referendum, which isn’t really too hard to pull off in Syria—it’s not what we would call a real example of democracy in action, since the cards are all stacked in the Assad family’s favor. Example: A referendum in 2007 overwhelmingly endorsed him as president for a second seven-year term….oh, and he was the only candidate on the ballot. Nonetheless, Bashar was seen as the last great hope amongst domestic reformers due to his young age and technocratic savvy.

Before his “election”, Bashar’s sole claim to Syrian fame was as one of the founders and heads of the Syrian Computer Society, an organization which he spearheaded to bring the Internet to Syria. Lame as this may sound, this laid the foundation for Bashar’s cultivation of a new crop of government leaders culled from the technocrats he associated with during this time, a younger bunch of political figures savvy in international finance and technology. A true “21st century man”, Bashar is also apparently quite the video game nut, X-Box in particular. During the Israeli raid on a purported nuclear plant in northern Syria in 2007, Bashar was enraged to have a 6-hour run on “Grand Theft Auto” interrupted by the bombing. Don’t mess with the man when he’s in his zone!

In Syria, Bashar’s record has been mixed since taking office. He originally ushered in a brief period of openness and cautious reform, wanting to perhaps push for economic and political liberalization in this ‘Damascus Spring.’ Some political prisoners were released, restrictions on the media were eased, and political debate was tolerated…all of which was a stark contrast to his father’s oppressive policies.  However, the pace of change alarmed the entrenched bureaucratic establishment and powerful military elite who collectively pushed to slow this change if not stymie it altogether. Like the “Mace of Blizzards” that he wields so adroitly in “World of Warcraft”, Bashar had to put a chill-pill on political dissent, arguing that the process needed to be gradual and free of external pressures. On the other hand, he did force out some old farts from the Ba’ath Party (the only political party with power, which Bashar also heads) and government ranks, lowering the mandatory retirement age and replacing these fogies with some of his cooler, Corona-sipping, computer-geek buddies from the old days.

Economically, the situation is shaky also. The Syrian economy would be described as weak at best, and with the fastest growing birth rate in the world, things are looking dire for the next couple of decades for the country. To open up the economy, Bashar has been pushing for Syrian membership in a Euro-Mediterranean partnership group: a ‘Mediterranean Union’, so coined by French President Nicolas Sarkozy, which would be modeled after the EU (European Union). In fact, Bashar’s blossoming love affair with Sarkozy, has been moving this idea along quickly, much to the chagrin of the United States. What? Why would the US care about European/Syrian economic ties? Oh yeah! Because the US hates Syria!

A-ha! Now we get to the real important stuff you need to know to understand this guy’s particular importance in world affairs. See, Israel has classically hated Syria, which translates to the US hating Syria, but even many other Arab states hate Syria too…and Bashar got to deal with all of this hate. So why the hate?

For starters, Syria is overwhelmingly Arab ethnicity and is part of the real ‘core’ of Arab thought and political power.  In this regard, Syria has participated in most of the declared wars upon the state of Israel, and has still not officially ‘recognized’ the existence of the state at all. Syria lost a part of its own territory, an area named the Golan Heights, to Israel the Six-Days War of 1967….an issue of much contention right on up to this day.  So Israel and Syria have issues.

But it gets even more complicated: Syria is also overwhelmingly Sunni Islam. That in and of itself is no big deal, as 85% of all the Muslims in the world are of the Sunni persuasion. The other 15% of Muslims in the world are of the Shi’a/Shi’ite variety.  So Syria is mostly Sunni. BUT Bashar al-Assad, like his entire family and the ruling/military elite of Syria, is an Alawite. Alawites are a prominent minority religious group who describe themselves as a sect of Shi’a Islam. Some conservative Sunnis do not even recognize Alawis as Muslims at all, especially in places like ultra-conservative Saudi Arabia. Of course, the ultra-conservative Sunni Saudis also don’t much like the straight-up Shi’as either…speaking of which…

Do you know any other places that are Shi’a Islam? Oh hell yes! If you said Iran, then give yourself a hit off the hookah! And now you know why some other Arab states also hate Syria: the Syrian leadership has deep and entrenched ties with Shi’a Iran, a country that most other Arab states totally despise. Iran is not Sunni but Shi’a; they are also not Arab, but Persian. So Arab countries see increasingly powerful Iran as a regional threat.  And Syria has for decades allowed itself to be a conduit for the movement of weapons and money from Shi’a Iran thru Shi’a-led Syria over to Shi’a-inspired Hezbollah…which is a terrorist/political group located in Lebanon that fights against Israel. Got all this mess so far?

So Israel hates them because Syria has fought wars against them and also helps arm Hezbollah. The US hates Syria for much the same reasons, especially since the US labels Hezbollah a terrorist group, and, well, the US is fighting terrorism. The Bush administration really hated Syria, and perpetually pressured them to stop their Shi’a support….and came close to putting them into the infamous ‘Axis of Evil’ many times. The US and Israel also hate Syria since they are buddies with problem-child Iran. And that’s also why many Arab states don’t dig Syria, as they see them as sell-outs who are helping spread Iranian influence throughout the region. But back to Bashar….

Here’s why it’s good to know this dude: things may be a-changing in this regional stew of strained ties and strategic shenanigans because Bashar is mixing things up! In the region, Bashar has managed to tiptoe through a minefield of issues. His ascension to the presidency was initially seen by the Israelis as being a positive step after the constipated years of his father’s reign. And how! Despite the public and media-driven howling about Syrian-Israeli tensions, peace between the two would be most easily achieved. Secret negotiations between businessmen and low-level diplomats from both sides has been occurring since Bashar took power.  Even hard-line, hawkish Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, during his first tenure as PM, tasked an American citizen with opening secret negotiations with the Syrians!

All Bashar wants back is the Golan Heights, which would make him wildly popular and effectively secure his presidency-for-life. And he may get it! In return, he will have to give recognition of the right for Israel to exist, and perhaps to stop funneling weapons to Hezbollah. But if Bashar does this (which seems increasingly likely), it will open a whole new chapter on Middle Eastern affairs. He already has made huge strides on softening the Syrian image in the world by pulling his troops out of Lebanon in 2005…after decades of Syrian domination of the Lebanese political scene, which pissed off the Lebanese, the Israelis, the US, and others. (Look up ‘Cedar Revolution’ if you want more details.) Syria has now essentially conceded Lebanese independence, embassies are to be opened, and diplomatic credentials are to be exchanged.

Bashar is playing the great game of Middle East shenanigans adroitly. Not only is he resisting US pressure on his relationships with Iran and Hezbollah, he is, at the same time wisely leaving the Israeli-reconciliation option open. On top of that, Bashar has been working hard in strengthening economic and political ties with the EU, Russia and even China…perhaps at the expense of his Arab neighborhood, particularly Saudi Arabia. No love lost between those two. In other words, Bashar is trying to become more of an internationalist, relying less on ties to standard Arab alliances, and increasingly less concerned with opinions of the US as well.

As one of the self-styled, “next generation” of Middle East leaders, like King Abdullah of Jordan, Bashar, with his technological X-Box savvy and love of Phil Collins, has managed to weather the domestic and regional storms thus far.  One of the youngest Middle Eastern leaders in power, he is likely to be around for a long time, and he along with his smokin’ hot wife is certainly going to be changing the landscape of the region.

January 2012 Update: Bashar al-Ass-wad?

How fares Syria in the Arab Spring? Weeeeell, Bashie’s reform minded agenda, though hesitant and wishy-washy has gone the way of the majestic Syrian Oryx. The regional upheavals may have well presented Bashie with an opportunity to make good on his promises of reform, side-stepping the potential backlash from hardliners in his regime by citing the wave of change in the surrounding states as an “excuse” to reform. But, well, if the ever-growing pile of corpses in Syria’s urban centers are any indication, this option has gone bye-bye.

First, a look back at 2011 in Syria. Domestic tensions have always been around: Kurdish dissatisfaction with the state of their civil rights and what-not in Syria; muted Sunni disaffection for the Shia-rule-by-minority in Syria (the Assads follow a sub-sect of Shia Islam, thus their Iranian ties); and general youth apprehension about the lack of change during Bashie’s decade in power and the continuing oppressive policies of censorship and detention. This coupled with a horribly high unemployment rate (25%!), a fall in living standards, and the Arab Spring events toppling dictators all around led to a testy situation.

By January 2011, people were setting themselves on fire a la Tunisian reflexive-arsonist Mohammed Bouazzizi. Protests started breaking out in the Kurdish northwest of the country, were brutally put down, sparked protests elsewhere, these were brutally put down, etc. You get the picture. Spreading to the southern border with Jordan, protests broke out in Dera’ also and soon spread to other cities, though Damascus, until recently, was pretty quiet. As the summer wore on, the regime reaction became more and more violent, with tanks and troops being sent into urban centers. Shit got even more complicated once army defectors started coalescing into the Free Syrian Army which began moving against regime troops. The non-existent domestic opposition forces also began taking steps to form a Syrian National Council and began begging for international assistance. The international community stepped in eventually, with the Arab League itself, bastion of inaction and lameness, sanctioning Syria and threatening to suspend its membership for its killing of civilians and crushing of protests. By December, some 5000 people have been killed in Syria.

What happened? Is Bashie pulling the strings? In the first months, his government did make some tentative steps towards reform allowing greater political participation (via allowing new political parties), better status for Kurds in the country, and dismantling that pesky emergency law. However, this didn’t do much to stop the government forces from killing thousands of people. Is Bashie the puppet master? In an ABC interview, Bashie denied responsibility for the bloody reaction against the opposition protests. Is he just trying to cover his ass? It’s hard to tell at this point. Given his earlier reform attempts which were slapped down by vested hard-line interests in his government, his hands may very well be tied. Who exactly controls the armed forces or the police in Syria is murky.

This may very well not matter at all. The vehemence and violence of his regime’s reaction has led to across-the-board international criticism of al-Asad. The issue of what he knew and when he knew it is moot. Heaps of sanctions, Arab League criticism, and increasing calls for some sort of Libya-like military intervention do not bode well for Bashie. At this point there seems to be little that he could do to retain any sort of legitimacy in the eyes of the Syrian people. His resignation or removal from power involuntarily is the most likely outcome.