The Final Push for World Government

What Happens If Greece Really Defaults?

NBC Nightly News Video: Workers Strike to Protest Spending Cuts in Greece (March 11, 2010)

March 11, 2010

U.S. News & World Report - Earlier this week, Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou traveled to the United States to promote a message: We're in this together. The debt crisis that has threatened the Greek economy and the stability of the European Union's monetary policies "very much involves America's interests," Papandreou stated in a speech at the Brookings Institution in Washington.

The prime minister--who was born in St. Paul, Minn.--even connected the current crisis to the Great Depression as well as the Great Recession.

"If the European crisis metastasizes, it could create a new global financial crisis with implications as grave as the U.S.-originated crisis two years ago," he said.

But the path from a Greek crisis to a U.S. crisis is not a direct one. The European Union is hoping it can contain Greece's debt crisis before the problems spread across the continent--threatening the stability of all countries that use the euro, or the euro zone--and then over the Atlantic.

The crisis began shortly after the election last fall of the new socialist government led by Papandreou. State officials revealed that Greece's budget deficit was at 14 percent of GDP--almost twice what the official Greek government statistics had reported. Two months later, Moody's downgraded Greece's debt to A2, raising the possibility of Greece defaulting on its debt.

If Greece defaults, "it risks exacerbating the economic downturns and could even reignite an acute financial crisis" through higher interest rates, Marc Chandler, global head of currency strategy at investment firm Brown Brothers Harriman, wrote in a report.

A Greek default would hit Americans hard in one major area: exports. According to the Economic Report of the President by the White House's Council of Economic Advisers, in order to "fill the gaps left in demand" by the recession, "net exports need to rise." President Obama announced in his State of the Union address a goal of doubling exports over the next five years. That goal might be hard to reach if Greece's debt crisis is not contained.

"Under the scenario where things get much worse in Europe, the dollar would get strengthened relative to the euro, and that would create a policy headache for the Obama administration," says Steve Hanke, an economist at Johns Hopkins University.

A stronger dollar would make U.S. exports more expensive. In addition, as interest rates in Europe soar and the euro falls in value in response to the credit crunch, Europeans would be unable to buy as many U.S. products.

The likelihood of that scenario depends partially on what the European Union decides to do about Greece. In reaction to this panic in Greece, much of the rest of Europe became frustrated over Greece's ability to hurt the rest of the continent economically but with little accountability owing to the fact that Greece is an independent state. Because Greece uses the euro, its fiscal problems can weaken the currency and lead to higher interest rates for all Europeans. A February poll found that a majority of Germans want Greece out of the euro zone.

Greek officials have received reassuring signs from Europe's leaders that the European Union will bail out the country in some way to assure creditors that it will not default on its debt. Jose Manuel Barroso, president of the European Commission, also announced this week that whatever mechanisms the EU uses to help Greece will be in line with the laws of the EU--assuaging fears that a bailout would violate the Maastricht Treaty, the agreement that created the euro.

But it is not guaranteed that bailing out Greece will save it and, by extension, the euro zone. Hanke worries that even with a bailout, wealthy Greeks and foreign investors will not stop withdrawing their money from Greek banks, from which they have already pulled out billions of euros. In order to get the rest of Europe's support for a bailout, Greece has had to promise to fill in its budget with more tax revenue. But paradoxically, those taxes might cause even more people to flee the Greek financial system, says Hanke.

"In effect, with bank runs coupled with capital flights, you would get a collapse in credit in Greece," he says.

Such a collapse would have two major potential effects.

• First, a credit crunch would spread to other European countries that have vulnerable economies. For example, "if you had a lot of capital flight out of Greece, all of a sudden people in Spain say, 'We're going to be next,' " says Hanke.



• Second, the credit crunch would increase the likelihood of Greece defaulting on its debt. In such a scenario, Greece could temporarily leave the euro zone and return to its former currency, the drachma, which would be heavily devalued against the euro.

There are still several signs that Greece can use the market to navigate out of the crisis without a default. Last week, Athens sold 10 billion euros of 10-year sovereign bonds to foreign investors. But an amount of 23 billion euros is needed to meet government obligations through May. And Greece has only begun to implement changes to its budget that will bring it out of a fiscal hole. Earlier this month, the government announced a plan of cuts to wages of government employees, tax hikes on tobacco and alcohol, and other measures expected to raise 4.8 billion euros. But these steps will reduce Greece's budget deficit by only 2 percent of GDP. It now stands at 12.7 percent of GDP, well above the European Union's target of 3 percent. Even the changes so far have not been easy politically. Several of the country's labor unions are striking in protest of the spending cuts and tax increases ...

Welcome to the United States of Iceland

March 11, 2010

Fortune - It's time to start paying attention to the financial sinkhole that Iceland is trying to climb out of -- the view from inside of it is eerily similar to our own.

An Icelandic savings bank, Icesave, had attracted billions in deposits from hundreds of thousands of British and Dutch citizens, due to the phenomenally high interest rates it offered. Icesave collapsed in 2008, for much the same reason Lehman Brothers, WaMu, and hundreds of local savings banks did: its bankers used their cash to make complicated, bad, leveraged investments, mostly on real estate.

The British and Dutch have made their citizens whole, bailing out Icesave after it became clear the Icelandic government didn't have the resources to do the same. Now, they expect to be repaid. But in a referendum there this past weekend,only 1.8% of voters favored a plan to pay back the $5.3 billion Iceland owes. Iceland has agreed in principle to repay the bailout to the UK and Netherlands, but the fight is over the terms and interest rate of the payment plan.

To call the rejected terms loan-sharking would be a disservice to usury. They called for every Icelandic family to essentially throw a quarter of its income towards servicing the loan for the next eight years. But this isn't the end: one way or another, the bill will come due, and Iceland's 320,000 citizens will be paying for the hubris of a few hundred of their own, who dubbed themselves "investment bankers."

The amount owed -- $5.3 billion -- sounds like a rounding error to Americans, but, per capita, it would be the equivalent of the United States taking on a $5 trillion debt. Sounds impossible, until you consider that our real bailout tab, as calculated by the New York Times, is already $2 trillion. Moreover, the government has obligated itself to pay out $12.5 trillion if things get worse.

In Vanity Fair last April, Michael Lewis wrote, "Iceland instantly became the only nation on earth that Americans could point to and say, 'Well, at least we didn't do that.'" Yet in a pretty real way, we did do "that." We have a more sophisticated central banking system, and there are more countries, like China, in whose interest it is to protect the value of the American dollar, thanks to their ownership of our national debt. In that crucial way, we've dodged Iceland's true peril: watching the value of its currency, the króna, crash against the debt it owes in foreign currencies like the sterling and euro. It's looking more and more like our craftiest bankers factored the inimitable strength and guarantee of the U.S. dollar into their reckless gambles.

But the rest of us are really just lucky that the dollar can survive these hurricane-level economic forces without blowing apart. One way or another, the bill is coming due, and America's 300 million citizens will be paying for the hubris of a few thousand of their own, who dubbed themselves "investment bankers."

While Lewis summons a gentle humor to chronicle a tiny nation's transformation from European fishing capital to destroyer of capital markets, it's worth remembering America's Rube Goldberg financial machinery sprung from a society that was once far more concerned with agriculture (and later, manufacturing) than with inventing complicated and opaque ways to manufacture wealth.

It's too easy and wrong to look at Iceland as being somehow dumber than we were. Their problems aren't just an outgrowth of our financial handiwork; their problems are our financial handiwork. And Icelanders have thoroughly rejected being placed in hock to exonerate the tiny segment of the population that threw their country into chaos.

In our democracy, we didn't have that choice. From Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson's ramming of TARP through Congress, to Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner's decision to abandon subtlety and mainline dollars into bank balance sheets, even our presidential election had little impact on our government's deployment of huge amounts of capital to save our obese banking system.

Icelandic journalist Iris Erlingsdottir wrote in the Huffington Post:

"While we have been endlessly debating IceSave, our unemployment rate has continued to climb, the number of insolvencies has continued to increase, and the number of public services has continued to decrease. Other scandals of comparable magnitude and abuse of taxpayer money -- but involving only Icelanders -- are being ignored by the Icelandic media."

Change a few nouns -- health care, Citigroup (C, Fortune 500) -- and Erlingsdottir is writing about Washington as Reykjavik.

Just because the crisis has been "managed" doesn't mean it's over. As economist Simon Johnson writes:

"The true fiscal cost arising from our recent financial excesses is the increase in net government debt held by the private sector. This will likely amount to around 40 percentage points of GDP."

Servicing that debt will likely affect our promise as a nation, not for years, but decades.

Whatever settlement Icelanders finally swallow, their financial system, at its peak just a minor moon in the constellation, is already as barren as the island's volcanic bedrock. But precious little has changed about Wall Street's massive gravitational pull in the U.S. and the world.

Our banks are still too big to fail, their boards are still poorly composed, we have no Consumer Financial Protection Agency, no systemic regulator, no resolution authority, and no reform of mortgage securitization or ratings agencies, two of the institutions that most enabled the crisis to occur. We've been distracted from the task of preventing another crisis from happening by the task of minimizing the current one, and as a result, we've done neither, while allowing our other domestic problems to snowball.

In Iceland, it's expected the ruling political party could be forced to step down if it can't come up with a loan plan the public approves of. The closest thing the U.S. gets to a bailout referendum is the 2010 midterm election. It's still unclear what happens to Iceland next, as it grapples with recovering from its terrible financial fever. But it might be time to stop treating Icelanders' predicament as a sad footnote to the global crisis, and start searching for lessons on what, save massive structural reforms, is still in store for us.